Modern Uzbekistan: economy, reforms, and international relations

Shavkat Mirziyoyev took office in December 2016. Within eighteen months, he had floated the currency (September 2017), removed the exit-visa requirement for Uzbek citizens (January 2019), opened the country to visa-free entry for most Western passports, dismantled the Soviet-era forced-labour cotton harvest, and begun a large-scale privatisation programme. Uzbekistan joined the WTO accession process in 2018 and secured a first sovereign Eurobond in 2019. The reforms have not resolved every problem — the political system remains centralised, and the media environment is constrained — but the reform-era Uzbekistan is a measurably more open country than the Uzbekistan of 2015.

Uzbekistan's GDP crossed roughly $130 billion (€123 billion) in 2025 — the country's largest single-year figure ever. Growth in 2025 was around 7.7 per cent, up from 6.5 per cent in 2024, and the World Bank projects sustained growth of 5.5–7 per cent through the late 2020s. Uzbekistan is the second-largest economy in Central Asia after Kazakhstan, and it has the most diversified economic base in the region.

The economy divides roughly as follows: services (about 47 per cent of GDP), industry (30 per cent, including a large mining sector), and agriculture (23 per cent). Uzbekistan is one of the top five gold producers in the world (Muruntau, in the Kyzylkum, is one of the largest open-pit gold mines anywhere), a major uranium producer, and holds significant natural gas reserves. Cotton — the Soviet-era monoculture — has been steadily diversified downwards, and the textile industry now spins its own cotton domestically rather than exporting raw fibre.

Foreign direct investment reached around $37 billion in 2025. China, Russia, and the Gulf states (particularly the UAE and Saudi Arabia) are the largest investors, alongside Turkey, Korea, and — increasingly — the EU.

Uzbekistan has invested heavily in becoming a regional IT hub. The IT Park (established 2019 in Tashkent) offers a residency regime for technology companies with tax holidays and dollar-repatriation rights, and hosts around 1,000 companies and 30,000+ engineers by 2025. Silicon Uzbekistan, a broader national digital strategy launched in 2023, aims to grow IT exports to $5bn/year by 2030 (from around $500m in 2024).

The World Bank's Technology Readiness Index moved Uzbekistan up 71 places in 2025, into the global top 10, a sign of visible measurable improvement in digital infrastructure. The reform-era startup ecosystem includes local unicorns Uzum (super-app and marketplace) and Payme (fintech), and active regional VC investment from Sturgeon Capital, Aloqa Ventures, and DOMiNO Ventures.

Tourism has been designated a strategic economic sector. Foreign visitor trips grew from about 2 million in 2016 to 11.68 million in 2025 — a nearly sixfold increase. Tourism export revenues surpassed $4 billion in 2025. The government's target is 20 million foreign visitors by 2030, and the sector has been prioritised in national planning.

Uzbekistan has also modernised the mechanics: the 2018 e-visa launch, the extension of visa-free entry, the introduction of the Afrosiyob fast train, the restoration of Khiva's Ichan Kala and Bukhara's old town, and the 2026 launch of a unified national tourism digital platform are all pieces of the same programme. Boutique heritage hotels, particularly in Bukhara and Samarkand, have multiplied.

Uzbekistan is a presidential republic. The president is elected by direct popular vote for a seven-year term (extended from five in the 2023 constitutional referendum). The bicameral Oliy Majlis (parliament) has a Legislative Chamber and a Senate. Provincial governors (khokims) are appointed by the president.

President Mirziyoyev was re-elected in July 2023 with roughly 88 per cent of the vote following the constitutional changes that allow him to serve two more seven-year terms. The government retains tight political control, and the political spectrum inside the country remains narrow, but reform-era changes have measurably widened civic space — the number of registered NGOs, media outlets, and religious organisations has all grown since 2016.

Uzbekistan's foreign policy has been described as 'multi-vectored' — active engagement with every major partner without alignment to any bloc. Highlights of the 2020s:

For businesses considering Uzbekistan the standard shortlist of sectors includes: hospitality and travel infrastructure (unmet capacity in Samarkand, Bukhara, and Khiva); textiles and apparel (Uzbek cotton is now spun domestically, and the country is emerging as a mid-cost apparel manufacturer); IT services and outsourcing (competitive labour costs, English-language talent, IT Park tax regime); renewable energy (solar and wind — the government has contracted around 12 GW of solar/wind capacity to be built by 2030); mining (Uzbekistan is opening new gold and copper concessions); and agri-processing (fruit and horticulture).

Legal and regulatory reform has improved but is not complete. The country has climbed roughly 70 places on the World Bank's Doing Business rankings between 2016 and 2020 (when the rankings were paused). Corruption remains a real risk factor — Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index put Uzbekistan at 121st in 2024, up from 156th in 2015. IT Park residency and specific free-economic zones offer protective wrappers for foreign investors.

Three trends are worth watching for the second half of the 2020s. First, whether the reform pace is maintained through the current presidential term; the direction is set but the pace matters. Second, the demographic transition — the largest working-age cohort in Uzbek history is entering the labour force this decade, and the country's economic performance will be judged by how well it absorbs that cohort. Third, the delicate geopolitical balance between Russia, China, and the West. Uzbekistan's multi-vector diplomacy has served it well so far; the coming decade will test whether it can continue.